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Abstract
This paper presents a simple model of risk-averse banks that face uncer-
tainty over funding conditions in the money market. It shows that increased
funding uncertainty: (i) creates risk-based loan-deposit synergies, (ii) often
causes bankslending volumes and their protability to decline, (iii) can ex-
plain more intense competition for retail deposits (including deposits turning
into a loss leader), and (iv) typically dampens the rate of pass-through
from changes in the central banks policy rate to market interest rates. These
results can explain some elements of commercial banksbehaviour and the
reduced e¤ectiveness of monetary policy during the 2007/9 nancial crisis.
Keywords: Bank lending, interbank market, interest rate pass-through,
loan-to-deposit ratio, loan-deposit synergies, loss leader, monetary policy.
JEL classications: D40 (market structure and pricing), E43 (interest
rates), G21 (banks).
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1 Introduction
Banks play a critical role in the economy as intermediaries that channel savings
into higher-yielding investments. However, recent events in nancial markets have
made clear that our understanding of banksbehaviour as borrowers and lenders
is far from complete. The nancial crisis began in August 2007 with an extended
period of turmoil in money markets, in which interest rates on term lending between
banks disconnected from the Feds target overnight rate. Taylor andWilliams (2009)
document how the federal funds rate, as well as interest rates on unsecured (i.e.,
uncollateralized) term loans between banks (measured, for example, by three-month
LIBOR), diverged substantially from the central banks policy rate and remained
unusually volatile for an extended period of time. Moreover, such disruptions were
not limited to the US, but occurred in nancial markets around the world, including
in the UK, the Eurozone, and Japan.
In this paper, I use a simple, partial-equilibrium model to show how such height-
ened uncertainty over funding conditions in the money markets can help explain
several diverse aspects of commercial banksbehaviour as observed in the recent
nancial crisis. These include a reduction in bank lending, decreases in the size of
banksbalance sheets, and increased competition for retail deposits. Moreover, the
model predicts that higher funding uncertainty leads to a decline in bank protabil-
ity and reduces the inuence of monetary policy on equilibrium market interest rates
on loans and deposits.
I consider a risk-averse bank that makes loans to and takes deposits from its
customers, and is also funded by equity capital and participation in the wholesale
funding market. The bank has a degree of market power in loan and deposit markets,
while it acts as a price-taker in the money market. The key feature of the model
is that the interest rate at which the bank can borrow (or lend) in the wholesale
market is uncertain. This may reect recent dislocations in interbank markets, but,
more generally, could also represent uncertainty over possible actions by the central
bank that a¤ect a banks funding conditions.1
I show that funding uncertainty leads to risk synergiesbetween the loan and
deposit sides of a bank: An increase, say, in a banks deposit base reduces the fund-
ing risk exposure of further loan commitments, which in turn makes loans them-
selves more attractive (Proposition 1). As uncertainty over funding conditions in-
creases, these risk synergies become stronger, and the bank becomes more concerned
1I do not attempt to explain what causes such uncertainty over funding conditions, but rather
focus on exploring its impact on bank behaviour. Taylor and Williams (2009) present empirical
evidence that movements in unsecured interbank funding rates in the recent nancial crisis can
be explained by changing perceptions of counterparty risk amongst market participants. Note
especially that such unsecured borrowing is not backed with collateral requirements (in contrast,
say, to repurchase agreements (repos) between banks).
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with asset-liability management. This result contributes to an emerging literature
on loan-deposit synergies (see, e.g., Kashyap, Rajan and Stein, 2002, and Gatev,
Schuermann and Strahan, 2009) that focuses on interactions between the two sides
of a banks balance sheet.
An increase in funding uncertainty induces highly extended banks with high loan-
to-deposit ratios to essentially reverse their prior strategy: they now cut back on
their loan commitments, while at the same time trying to attract a stronger deposit
base with higher interest rates (Proposition 2). This result is consistent with the
behaviour of many commercial banks throughout the course of the nancial crisis,
including widespread reductions in leverage and shrinkage of balance sheets. In the
UK, for example, banks such as Royal Bank of Scotland had high loan-to-deposit
ratios at the outset of the nancial crisis and were heavily dependent on wholesale
funding, while, in response, they have now set themselves the aim of reducing their
loan-to-deposit ratios to no more than 100%.
As the crisis unfolded in 2008, a large number of banks found themselves burning
through their equity capital due to writedowns on risky loans and other securities,
as well as trading losses (see, e.g., Brunnermeier, 2009). I show that such decreases
in equity capital also induce banks to reduce their loan-to-deposit ratios, with equi-
librium interest rates on loans and deposits both increasing (Proposition 3).2 Taken
together, Propositions 2 and 3 may help explain the empirical evidence that US
banks sharply decreased lending in the nancial crisis, but that banks with better
access to deposit nance (higher deposit-to-asset ratios) cut their lending by less
(Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010).
Funding uncertainty also has surprisingly strong implications for bank protabil-
ity and consumer welfare in loan and deposit markets. In particular, increased
uncertainty over funding conditions per se reduces a banks expected prots, as
measured, for example, by its average return on equity (Proposition 4). Moreover,
loan-deposit synergies can lead to cross-subsidization where either its loans or its de-
posits business becomes a loss leader.For example, if the market for loans is very
attractive relative to deposits, increased funding uncertainty may induce a bank to
o¤er depositors an interest rate that exceeds its own (expected) funding rate. This
implies that depositor welfare exceeds the level associated with a competitive market
(Proposition 5). This risk-based version of loss leaders di¤ers markedly from other
mechanisms that have been identied in the industrial-organization literature.3
2Amongst other things, this result is also consistent with empirical evidence that low-capital
banks tend to charge higher interest rates on loans to their borrowers than well-capitalized banks,
see, e.g., Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002).
3These generally rely on product complementarities (e.g., razor and razor blades) or on par-
ticular features of the strategic interaction between rms (e.g., related to entry deterrence). By
contrast, in my model, loss leaders can occur even in a single-bank setting where loans and deposits
are entirely independent in terms of demand and supply conditions (as well as operating costs).
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Central banks around the world responded to the recent turmoil in nancial mar-
kets by aggressively cutting interest rates. The degree to which such rate changes
are passed on to market interest rates is a key factor in determining the impact
of monetary policy on the real economy. However, many commentators expressed
surprise at the apparently small impact that rate cuts had, especially across credit
markets. I show that heightened funding uncertainty typically dampens the degree
of pass-through from changes in the central banks policy rate to equilibrium market
interest rates for borrowers and depositors (Proposition 6). This provides an expla-
nation for why monetary policy may have been less e¤ective at inuencing bank
behaviour, and why the common assumption of full interest rate pass-through may
be unsafe under conditions of money market turmoil.
In broad terms, these results resemble the emerging base of stylized facts on
bank behaviour in the 2007/9 nancial crisis, notably on reduced bank lending,
increased competition for deposits, and reduced monetary policy e¤ectiveness. They
are consistent with a view that the turmoil in money markets that began in the
summer of 2007 played an important role in causing and prolonging the crisis. In
banking systems with high loan-to-deposit ratios such as the UK, increased funding
uncertainty tends to make the banks themselves, their shareholders and borrowers
worse o¤, while depositors may end up benetting substantially.
The fact that heightened funding uncertainty can account for such diverse aspects
of observed bank behaviour distinguishes this mechanism from others. For example,
in a standard model, a decrease in the demand for loans will typically also lead to
a decline in bank lending and bank protability. However, it is less clear how or
why reduced loan demand simultaneously also increases deposit rates and dampens
equilibrium interest rate pass-through. Funding uncertainty, by contrast, presents a
simple yet striking mechanism that connects all these elements of bank behaviour.
Section 2 sets up the benchmark model, and Section 3 derives its equilibrium
conditions. Sections 4 to 7 contain the main analysis and results. Section 8 presents
several natural extensions to the benchmark model; these show that the key insights
are robust to a variety of changes in model specication, notably to the presence of
multiple risks (such as credit risks in a banks loan portfolio) and to di¤erent forms
of competition between banks. Section 9 o¤ers concluding comments.
2 A simple model
I begin by considering a simple, partial-equilibrium model of a risk-averse bank that
makes loans and takes deposits from its customers, and is also funded by equity
capital and participation in the interbank market.
The bank has a degree of market power in loan and deposit markets, for exam-
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ple, due to product di¤erentiation (perhaps at a regional level), certain regulatory
restrictions, or because part of its customer base is captivedue to informational
lock-in or switching costs.4 In particular, the inverse demand curves for loans L is
given by rL = fL (L), where rL is the market interest rate on loans, and demand is
downward-sloping in that f 0L() < 0. Similarly, the inverse supply curve for deposits
D is given by rD = fD (D), where rD is the market interest rate on deposits, and
higher deposit rates attract more depositors, so f 0D() > 0.5
In addition to deposits, the banks operations are funded by an (exogenous)
amount of equity capital K that is put up by its shareholders; let  denote the
(per-unit) cost of capital. It can also borrow or lend in the money market, where I
adopt the notational convention that net borrowing is denoted by M (so the bank
is a net borrower if M  0 and a net lender otherwise). The banks balance sheet
constraint is therefore given by
L = D +M +K, (1)
where the banks only assets are its loans, and its liabilities are comprised of deposits,
net wholesale borrowing, as well as equity capital.
The key feature of the model is that the bank faces uncertainty over funding
conditions in the money market. In particular, the bank acts as a price-taker in the
wholesale market,6 but does not precisely know the funding rate r when it makes
decisions on its loans and deposits. It is useful to think of a banks funding rate as the
central banks policy rate plus a bank-specic spread. Taylor and Williams (2009)
document how interest rates on unsecured (i.e., uncollateralized) term loans between
banks diverged substantially from the central banks policy rate and remained
unusually volatile for an extended period of time during the recent crisis. This
uncertainty over funding conditions is most naturally associated with variability in
the spread (although there might also be some uncertainty over possible actions by
the central bank). For the following analysis, let r denote the expected funding
4See, e.g., Sharpe (1990) and Petersen and Rajan (1994) for theoretical and empirical support
for informational lock-in as a source of banksmarket power. Klemperer (1995) provides a general
discussion of switching costs, and see, e.g., Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003) for empirical evidence of
switching costs in banking.
5Following Allen and Gale (2000, Chapter 8) and Boyd and de Nicoló (2005), I here assume
implicitly that deposits are fully insured, so the supply of funds does not depend on risk. The
model could easily be extended to incorporate a at-rate insurance premium per unit of deposits
without a¤ecting any of the results presented.
6It is a standard assumption that banks are price-takers in the money market, see Hannan and
Berger (1991), Klein (1971), Neumark and Sharpe (1992), Wong (1997), and others. This can be
justied by noting that an individual bank may be too small to inuence wholesale funding rates.
A di¤erent strand of the literature focuses on the adverse impact of asymmetric information
in the interbank market, see, e.g., Freixas and Holthausen (2005), Freixas and Jorge (2008), and
Rochet and Tirole (1996).
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rate and let 2M denote the (overall) degree of funding uncertainty, measured by the
variance of the funding rate.
To focus sharply on the impact of funding uncertainty and its implications for a
banks asset-liability management, I assume that there are no operational economies
of scope between the loan and deposit sides of the bank. Without much further loss
of generality, the banks operating costs are normalized to zero.
All together, the banks prot function is therefore given by
 = rLL  rDD   rM   K, (2)
reecting the income from loans, interest payments on deposits, interest payments
(respectively, income) on the banks interbank position if it is a net borrower (re-
spectively, lender) in this market, and the cost of its equity capital. Finally, the bank
is risk-averse in that its concave utility function U () exhibits constant absolute
risk aversion, with coe¢ cient    U 00 () =U 0 ().
In an inuential paper, Froot and Stein (1998) argue that banks should be con-
cerned with risk management as they in practice cannot frictionlessly hedge all the
risks they face. There are many other reasons why banks may act as if they were
risk-averse, including costs of nancial distress, non-linear tax systems, and dele-
gation of control to risk-averse managers; see also Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990).
On the empirical side, Angelini (2000) shows how intra-day behaviour in the Italian
interbank market is consistent with risk aversion, while Hughes and Mester (1998),
Nishiyama (2007) and Ratti (1980) nd evidence for di¤erent degrees of risk-averse
behaviour by US commercial banks (or their managers).
The timing of the model can be summarized as follows. At the beginning of
the period, the bank commits to a volume of loans and deposits both optimally
chosen to maximize expected utility based its available equity capital and expected
funding conditions in the interbank market. Following this, the interbank rate is
realized, and the bank pays or receives money depending on whether it is a net
borrower or lender in the wholesale market. The banks end-of-period payo¤s from
the loan, deposit and money markets determine its overall prots.7
At the beginning of the period, the bank therefore solves the following problem
of maximizing expected utility subject to its balance sheet constraint:
max
L;D
E [U ()] subject to M = L D  K.
To simplify notation, let L  @=@L and D  @=@D, as well as LL 
@L=@L and DD  @D=@D. The banks problem turns out to be well-behaved
7Given the one-period nature of the model, I cannot use it to address issues arising from di¤ering
maturities of a banks assets and liabilities.
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whenever the two second-order conditions for the underlying risk-neutral benchmark
(where  = 0) are satised. These can be written in terms of the underlying demand
and supply functions as LL = 2f 0L(L) + Lf
00
L(L) < 0 and DD =  2f 0D(D)  
Df 00D(D) < 0. In other words, loan demand is not too convex and deposit supply is
not too concave. In the interest of generality, I leave the functional forms of fL()
and fD() unspecied for now.
Interior solutions for loans and deposits are guaranteed by fL(0) > r > fD(0)
and K  L.8 Note that LD  @L=@D = 0 since there are no operating synergies
between the loan and deposit sides of the bank (so also DL = 0). In what follows, I
focus on the interesting case where the banks cost of capital  is su¢ ciently low for
it to be an active participant in loan and deposit markets. (I discuss the possibility
of the bank making losses and shutting down in Section 6.)
The model is perhaps best thought of as capturing the behaviour of a small or
medium-sized bank with a regional franchise that has some local market power, but
which takes the price of non-deposit sources of funds as given (perhaps because this
is determined at a national or international level). Interbank borrowing involves
unsecured term loans with durations of three months or similar (rather than, say,
collateralized overnight lending). Recent contributions by Allen and Gale (2000,
Chapter 8), Boyd and de Nicoló (2005), Hannan and Berger (1991), Neumark and
Sharpe (1992), Neven and Röller (1999), Stein (1998), and Wong (1997) analyze
related models of loan and/or deposit markets, although none of these consider the
impact of funding uncertainty in the money market.9
3 Loan-deposit synergies
In this section, I derive the equilibrium conditions for the model, and use them to
show that funding uncertainty naturally leads to risk synergiesbetween the loan
and deposit sides of a bank.
As a rst step to solving the problem, plugging the balance sheet constraint into
the banks prot function and some rearranging yields
 = (rL   r)L+ (r   rD)D + (r   )K. (3)
The bank derives prots from three sources. First, it makes an interest margin of
(rL   r) on the volume of its loan commitments L, reecting loan rates in excess
of wholesale funding costs. Second, it makes an interest margin of (r   rD) on the
8The condition K  L is su¢ cient to ensure that equilibrium deposits are non-negative. It is
very likely to be satised in practice since a banks loan portfolio is generally many times larger
than its capital base. (See also Section 6 for a linear example that brings out this condition.)
9Santomero (1984) provides a survey of the earlier literature that followed Klein (1971).
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volume of its deposit base D, reecting deposit rates below its own funding costs.
Third, it makes a spread of (r  ), which may be negative, on its equity capital K,
reecting its cost of capital together with the fact that equity implicitly relieves it
from borrowing a corresponding amount in the wholesale market.10
The two rst-order conditions for the banks problem are
E [U 0 () L] = 0 and E [U 0 () D] = 0, (4)
which simply states that the expected marginal utility both of additional loans and
deposits must be zero in equilibrium. Since marginal utility is positive U 0 () > 0,
these conditions can also be written as
E [L] +
cov (U 0 () ;L)
E [U 0 ()]
= 0 and E [D] +
cov (U 0 () ;D)
E [U 0 ()]
= 0. (5)
In equilibrium, the expected marginal prot on loans E [L] equals the marginal
riskfrom loans,  cov (U 0();L) =E [U 0()], and equivalently for deposits.11
To simplify these expressions, I use Taylor expansions (around expected prots
E []) for marginal risks, which yields cov (U 0 () ;L) =E [U 0 ()] =  cov (;L)
on the loan side and cov (U 0 () ;D) =E [U 0 ()] =   cov (;D) for deposits. By
Steins lemma, these approximations are exact for the case where uncertainty on the
funding rate is normally distributed, and, in general, they are reasonably accurate
whenever uncertainty is not too large.12
The two rst-order conditions for the banks problem can thus be restated as

L  E [L]    cov (;L) = 0, (6)
and

D  E [D]    cov (;D) = 0. (7)
To interpret these equations, observe rst that the marginal prot on loans L =
[fL(L) + Lf
0
L(L)]   r, so @L=@r < 0. The reason is simply that a higher fund-
ing rate depresses the interest margin the bank makes on loans. By contrast, the
10It is probably most natural that the required return on equity capital exceeds the wholesale
funding rate ( > r), but I do not require any assumptions on whether the spread (r   ) is
positive or negative in the subsequent analysis. (As noted above, I maintain the assumption that
 is su¢ ciently low for the bank to be an active participant in loan and deposits markets.)
11By denition, the risk premium  satises U(E[]   ) = E[U()], so di¤erentiating with
respect to loans implies that U 0(E[] ) (E[L]  @=@L) = 0. Using that E[XY ] = E[X]E[Y ]+
cov(X;Y ) for two random variables X and Y yields that the marginal risk from loans @=@L =
 cov (U 0();L) =E [U 0()] as claimed.
12Steins lemma states that if two random variables X and Y are bivariate normally distributed
and '0(Y ) < 1, then cov(X;'(Y )) = E['0(Y )]  cov(X;Y ). See, e.g., Huang and Litzenberger
(1988). To apply this result, note that if the funding rate r is normally distributed, then the banks
prots  and marginal prots on loans L and deposits D are also all normally distributed.
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marginal prot on deposits D = [ fD(D) Df 0D(D)] + r, so @D=@r > 0. From
these arguments, it is clear that the marginal risks on loans and deposits move
in opposite directions. Now consider the initial formulation of the banks prot
function as  = rLL   rDD   rM   K, and observe that cov (;L) = 2MM
while cov (;D) =  2MM . Clearly, if the bank is a net borrower in the whole-
sale market (with M > 0), then a higher funding rate r is bad news for its overall
prots. Moreover, from the rst-order conditions, this also implies that E [L] > 0
and E [D] < 0, so equilibrium loans are lower than under risk-neutrality (since
LL < 0), and, conversely, equilibrium deposits are higher (since DD < 0).13 The
opposite conclusions hold if the bank is a net lender in the wholesale market,M < 0.
Finally, if M = 0, then the banks overall prot  remains una¤ected by funding
uncertainty although decisions on loans and deposits remain interdependent at the
margin.
To see this interdependence more formally, let L(D) solve the rst-order condi-
tion for loans 
L = 0, and di¤erentiate to obtain that
@L
@D
=

LD
 
LL , (8)
where 
LL  @
L=@L and 
LD  @
L=@D. The second-order condition for loans

LL = LL     var (L) < 0, (9)
since E [LL] = LL < 0 and var (L) = 2M . Since there are no operational
synergies LD = DL = 0 (by assumption),

LD =    cov (D;L) . (10)
These arguments show that loan-deposit synergies exist whenever an increase in
deposits decreases the marginal risk that the bank faces on its loans (and vice
versa), that is
@L=@D  0 if and only if cov (D;L)  0:
It is easy to check that indeed cov (D;L) =  2M < 0, and putting these results
together gives that
@L
@D
=
2M
 LL + 2M
. (11)
The same approach shows that the response of equilibrium deposits to an increase
13Observe also that, in expectation, the bank always makes a positive interest margin from
providing nancial intermediation since E [L]+E [D] = [fL(L)  fD(D)]+Lf 0L(L) Df 0D(D) =
0, implying that (rL   rD) > 0 as f 0L() < 0 and f 0D() > 0. I discuss the impact of funding
uncertainty on bank protability in more detail in Section 6.
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in loans can be written as
@D
@L
=
2M
 DD + 2M
(12)
since E [DD] = DD < 0 by the second-order condition and var (D) = 2M .
As both cross e¤ects lie within the unit circle (that is, 0 < @L=@D < 1 and
0 < @D=@L < 1), there is a unique and stable equilibrium in loans and deposits in
what follows.
Proposition 1 In the presence of funding uncertainty 2M > 0, a bank has loan-
deposit synergies in that @L=@D > 0 and @D=@L > 0.
The intuition for the result is straightforward: All else equal, an increase in a
banks deposit base means that a further loan commitment leads to less borrowing in
the money market, and thus also to less funding risk exposure, which in turn makes
extending loans relatively more attractive. Note that this logic applies regardless of
whether the bank is a borrower or a lender in the money market overall.
Proposition 1 thus provides a reason for why there are synergies to a bank con-
ducting both loan and deposit activities under a single roof. Amongst other things,
such risk benets naturally give rise to a banks concerns with asset-liability manage-
ment. This contrasts sharply with similar models, e.g., Hannan and Berger (1991),
Neumark and Sharpe (1992), in which loan and deposit decisions are entirely inde-
pendent (often due to risk neutrality).14
Proposition 1 also o¤ers a perspective on the observation that, at the height of
the boom in the mid-2000s, banks funded most of the new loans from wholesale
borrowing rather than increases in their deposit bases. The proportion of a small
increase in a banks loan commitments that is funded by way of increased money
market exposure is determined by
dM
dL


1  @D

@L

=
 DD
 DD + 2M
. (13)
So, if funding uncertainty was indeed negligible during the boom period (or also
if risk aversion was very low), then dM=dL  1 and it is entirely rational for a
bank to fund an increase in loans almost solely by way of wholesale borrowing.
However, if funding uncertainty becomes more important, as with the onset of the
2007/9 nancial crisis, a bank relies more heavily on deposits for funding precisely
because of the higher risk synergies between the two sides of its balance sheet.15
14The independence of loans and deposits in the risk-neutral case is analogous to the classic
separation of savings and investment decisions with perfect capital markets. See also Kashyap,
Rajan and Stein (2002) for a related argument that a banks role as a liquidity provider in the face
of potential deposit withdrawals and drawdowns of loan commitments leads to synergies between
its loan and deposit sides.
15Using a di¤erent approach, a similar observation that loan-deposit synergies are especially
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4 Interbank market exposure
Building on these insights, I now explore the implications of funding uncertainty for
banksloans and deposit decisions and the corresponding interest rates. These also
yield predictions regarding its impact on banksinterbank market exposure.
Recall that the banks equilibrium choices of loans L and deposits D are de-
termined by a system of two simultaneous equations, where
L(D) solves 
L = 0 and D(L) solves 
D = 0.
Let the associated interest rates on loans rL = fL(L
) and deposits rD = fD(D
).
The e¤ect of an increase in funding uncertainty on a banks equilibrium loans is
thus given by
dL
d2M
=
@L
@2M
+
@L
@D
dD
d2M
. (14)
Funding uncertainty works via two channels: rst, directly on the optimal choice of
loans, and, second, indirectly via the impact on the optimal choice of deposits, which
in turn feeds back to equilibrium loans (see Proposition 1). The impact on deposits
can be written in the same way as dD=d2M = @D
=@2M + (@D
=@L) (dL=d2M),
and substituting this into the above gives
dL
d2M
=
@L
@2M
+
@L
@D
@D
@2M
1  @L

@D
@D
@L
 . (15)
The denominator of this expression is positive by the stability of equilibrium (that
is, 0 < @L=@D < 1 and 0 < @D=@L < 1). Di¤erentiating the rst-order conditions
yields the two partial e¤ects
@L
@2M
=
 M
 LL + 2M
and
@D
@2M
=
M
 DD + 2M
, (16)
for which the denominators are also positive by second-order conditions. From be-
fore, @L=@D = 2M= ( LL + 2M). Putting these together and some rearranging
shows that
@L
@2M
+
@L
@D
@D
@2M
=
 M
 LL + 2M

1  
2
M
 DD + 2M

. (17)
pronounced during times of nancial crisis has recently also been made by Gatev, Schuermann and
Strahan (2009).
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This leads to the conclusion that
dL=d2M  0 if and only if M  0.
So, by the stability of equilibrium, the sign of dL=d2M is thus determined by the
direct e¤ect @L=@2M rather than by the indirect e¤ect via deposits (which takes
the opposite sign).
The last condition can also usefully be expressed in terms of the banks loan-
to-deposit ratio. Letting `  L=D and the equity-to-deposit ratio   K=D, the
interbank market condition
M  0 if and only if `  1 +   `.
In other words, a bank that is a net borrower in the interbank market, or, equiv-
alently, has a loan-to-deposit ratio somewhat above 100%, responds to an increase
in funding uncertainty by cutting back on its loan commitments (and thus also re-
ducing the size of its balance sheet). The intuition is that a risk-averse bank gears
its decisions to perform better in bad states of the world. With increased funding
uncertainty, a wholesale market borrower becomes more concerned with outcomes
where funding rates are high. So the bank optimally cuts back on loans to do
relatively better in these states of the world.
The same method as above can also be used to show that equilibrium deposits
increase with funding uncertainty, that is dD=d2M  0 if and only ifM  0 if and
only if `  `. Since the change in a banks money market position dM=d2M =
(dL=d2M   dD=d2M), it also follows that dM=d2M  0 if and only if M  0 if
and only if `  `.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, an increase in funding uncertainty 2M induces a
bank with a high (low) loan-to-deposit ratio `  ` (` < `) to:
(i) extend fewer (more) loans L and take more (fewer) deposits D;
(ii) increase (decrease) interest rates on loans rL and deposits r

D;
(iii) reduce the size of its interbank market position jMj.
The 2007/9 nancial crisis had the key characteristic that funding uncertainty in
the interbank market increased sharply near its outset, and remained at unusually
high levels for an extended period of time (see, e.g., Taylor and Williams, 2009).
The result predicts that banks that have aggressively expanded their loan books,
leading to high loan-to-deposit ratios, react to heightened funding uncertainty by
essentially reversing their prior strategy: They now cut back loan commitments,
while at the same time trying to attract a stronger deposit base with higher interest
rates. Thus their money market exposures and loan-to-deposit ratios both fall.
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Indeed, there is signicant evidence that banks tried to reduce their exposure
to the wholesale market from when the nancial crisis began in the second half of
2007. The situation at the time was summarized by a bank manager at Alliance &
Leicester: Lenders are having to examine di¤erent funding routes. The increasing
rates have no doubt been driven by the turmoil in the wholesale markets.16 In the
UK, for example, many banks have sought to replace short-term wholesale nancing
with more funds from retail customers by raising interest rates on existing deposit
accounts and introducing various new savings products.
It is also plain that the recent nancial crisis has led to banks cutting back on
loans, thereby making it more di¢ cult and costly for retail and corporate customers
to borrow. For example, it was noted that banks have cut overdraft facilities
and unused credit lines, withdrawn from lending syndicates and abruptly called in
loans. When they do lend, they are charging higher arrangement fees and interest
at margins over their cost of funding that are considerably higher than they were
(The Economist, 24 January 2009). Although there are, of course, many reasons
behind this (others to which I turn in the following sections), it is consistent with
the result from Proposition 2 for highly leveraged banks.
It is well-known that the UK banking sector has become highly extended in recent
years. For instance, the average loan-to-deposit ratio of three of the largest players,
Barclays, Lloyds Banking Group and Royal Bank of Scotland, increased from around
100% in the early 2000s to 150% in 2008. More recently, however, several UK banks,
including Royal Bank of Scotland, have set themselves the aim of achieving a loan-
to-deposit ratio of no more than 100% over the next ve years(Financial Times,
19 June 2009). Finally, Northern Rock, the UK bank that was rescued by the
Bank of England near the beginning of the nancial crisis in September 2007, also
relied heavily on short-term funding from wholesale money markets (see, e.g., Shin,
2009).17
Conversely, the result predicts that banks with relatively low loan-to-deposit
ratios perhaps those that have had less aggressive credit strategies in the past
react to increased funding uncertainty by reducing their lending exposure in the
wholesale market. One interpretation of this is that funding uncertainty causes
liquidity in the interbank market to dry up: Existing borrowers want to borrow
less and lenders want to lend less than before. In other words, the demand for
16This quote is taken from the Financial Times, 1 December 2007. Alliance & Leicester is a
medium-sized British bank (and former building society) that was subsequently taken over by
Banco Santander of Spain (in October 2008).
17It is also interesting to note that some of the banks that have been hit hardest by the crisis
internationally had unusually high loan-to-deposit ratios at its outset. Based on gures from 2007,
Kaupthing and Landsbanki, two of the largest Icelandic banks, were reported to have loan-to-
deposit ratios of 226% and 142% respectively, while Allied Irish and Bank of Ireland, two of the
largest Irish banks, both had loan-to-deposit ratios of 158% (see Financial Times, 4 October 2008).
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interbank funding and its supply by commercial banks decrease simultaneously. In
some cases, central banks may consequently end up being the only remaining parties
left to provide funds in these markets.
It is worth stressing that none of these e¤ects would apply in a model with banks
that are always risk-neutral, but they all appear even with an arbitrarily small (but
positive) degree of risk aversion.
Furthermore, with mean-variance utility, the result from Proposition 2 applies
equally to an increase in risk aversion , holding the degree of funding uncertainty
2M xed or to any combination of increases in these two parameters. So an in-
terbank market borrower (with M > 0) responds to an increase in risk aversion
(higher ) by reducing loan commitments, attracting more deposits, and cutting
money market borrowing (dL=d < 0, dD=d > 0, dM=d < 0). Note especially
that this last conclusion also holds if the bank initially was risk-neutral (with  = 0),
and then becomes risk-averse for example, in the context of a nancial crisis.
5 Equity capital impacts
Funding uncertainty also opens up a key role for a risk-averse banks equity capital.
By contrast, with risk-neutral banks, changes in the amount of equity on the balance
sheet have no impact on equilibrium loan and deposit choices, as these are separable
in the banks prot function  = (rL   r)L+ (r   rD)D + (r   )K.
For a risk-averse bank, the impact of a change in equity capital can be worked
out in a similar way to funding uncertainty in the previous section.18 Again recall-
ing the two rst-order conditions for loans and deposits that determine the overall
equilibrium, it follows that
dL
dK
=
@L
@K
+
@L
@D
dD
dK
. (18)
Equity capital also a¤ects the optimal loan decision via two channels; the di-
rect channel, and indirectly via the optimal choice of deposits, which feeds back
to equilibrium loans. Since the impact on deposits is determined analogously,
18This analysis assumes implicitly that any capital requirement the bank faces is not binding,
at least not at all times; either the bank holds excess capital above a minimum requirement,
or its capital temporarily drops below well-capitalizedlevels a widespread phenomenon during
the recent nancial crisis. See, e.g., Berger, DeYoung, Flannery, Lee and Öztekin (2008) for recent
empirical evidence on excess capital holdings by US banks.
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dD=dK = @D=@K + (@D=@L) (dL=dK), this can be rewritten as
dL
dK
=
@L
@K
+
@L
@D
@D
@K
1  @L

@D
@D
@L
 , (19)
where the denominator is positive by stability. Di¤erentiating the rst-order condi-
tions yields the two partial e¤ects
@L
@K
=
2M
 LL + 2M
and
@D
@K
=
 2M
 DD + 2M
, (20)
for which the denominators are also positive by second-order conditions. From
before, @L=@D = 2M= ( LL + 2M) > 0. Putting these together and some
rearranging yields
@L
@K
+
@L
@D
dD
dK
=
2M
 LL + 2M

1  
2
M
 DD + 2M

. (21)
This shows that, in general, increases in equity capital lead to increases in equilib-
rium loans, dL=dK > 0. (So the sign of dL=dK is again determined by the direct
e¤ect, @L=@K.)
The same arguments on the deposits side can be used to show that, by contrast,
increases in equity capital lead to lower equilibrium deposits, so dD=dK < 0.
Proposition 3 In the presence of funding uncertainty 2M > 0, a decrease (in-
crease) in equity capital K induces a bank to:
(i) extend fewer (more) loans L and take more (fewer) deposits D;
(ii) increase (decrease) interest rates on loans rL and deposits r

D.
This result is somewhat stronger than the previous one in that it predicts that de-
creases in equity capital lead to contractions in loan-to-deposit ratios and increased
interest rates on loans and deposits for all banks, and not just those banks that are
net borrowers in the wholesale market.
Proposition 3 also speaks directly to the pattern of banksattempts at derisk-
ingin the 2007/9 credit crunch. As the crisis unfolded in 2008, a large number of
banks found themselves burning through their equity capital due to writedowns on
risky loans and other securities, as well as trading losses (see, e.g., Brunnermeier,
2009). The result provides an explanation for why this makes banks cut back on
loan commitments: All else equal, decreases in equity capital leave a bank more
exposed to interbank market borrowing, which is risky in the presence of funding
uncertainty. A risk-averse bank rationally responds by cutting back its loan-to-
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deposit ratio. Again, all else equal, this leads to the interest rates charged on loans
to increase, and the rates paid to depositors to increase.
Taken together, the results from the model help explain the emerging base of
stylized facts on bank lending in the nancial crisis. For example, using data on
syndicated loans, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) document that US banks sharply
decreased lending, especially around the height of the crisis in the 4th quarter of
2008. Importantly, they also nd that banks that had higher better access to deposit
nance (with higher deposit-to-asset ratios and thus less reliance on short-term debt)
cut their lending by less than other banks. This seems consistent with Propositions
2 and 3 taken together: Losses in equity capital cause all banks to contract lending,
but in an environment with heightened funding uncertainty banks with a strong
deposit base cut by relatively less.19
Conversely, if a bank builds up its equity capital, then this enables it to extend
more loans, while relying less on its deposit base. This reverse conclusion also
has a number of interesting implications. First, in the context of nancial crises,
it provides a reason why bank recapitalizations (by shareholders or governments)
can be useful in counteracting the upward pressure on interest rates on loans due
to increases in funding uncertainty (Proposition 2) or prior equity losses. Second,
taking a time-series perspective, it may also help explain how an extended period of
strong bank protability and equity accumulation (as in the mid-2000s, for example)
can make it rational for banks to increase their loan-to-deposit ratios whilst relying
more heavily on the wholesale market for funding. Third, taking a cross-sectional
perspective, the result is also consistent with evidence from Hubbard, Kuttner and
Palia (2002) that low-capital banks tend to charge higher interest rates on loans to
their borrowers (especially when these are small rms) than well-capitalized banks.
More generally, the interesting thing about Proposition 3 is that a banks balance
sheet constraint leads to something akin to a wealth e¤ectassociated with equity
capital even in a model e¤ectively set in a mean-variance framework.
6 Bank protability and consumer welfare
I have so far focused on the impact of funding uncertainty on prices and quantities,
namely equilibrium interest rates and a banks balance sheet. Based on this analysis,
I now draw out the implications for two key measures of surplus: Bank prots and
consumer welfare.
 Bank protability. The e¤ect of a change in funding uncertainty on a risk-
19Of course, as Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) also note, there are competing explanations for
an observed reduction in bank lending, notably a decrease in the demand for loans.
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averse banks equilibrium expected prots E [] can be written as
dE []
d2M
= E[L]
dL
d2M
+ E[D]
dD
d2M
. (22)
Suppose rst that the bank is a net borrower in the wholesale market, so M 
0. Then the rst-order conditions (from (6) and (7) and the following discussion)
imply that E [L]  0 and E [D]  0. By Proposition 2, an increase in funding
uncertainty then leads to a fall in loans and a rise in deposits, so dL=d2M  0 and
dD=d2M  0. It follows from (22) that equilibrium expected prots must decrease,
dE [] =d2M  0. These arguments work in the reverse way for the case when
M  0, also leading to opposite signs and hence dE [] =d2M  0.
Proposition 4 An increase in funding uncertainty 2M decreases a banks equilib-
rium expected prot E [].
The basic intuition for the result is that higher funding uncertainty tightens the
utility constrainton the banks expected prots, thus distorting its optimal loan
and deposit choices further away from the (prot-maximizing) risk-neutral case.
This in turn reduces the banks overall expected prots. Proposition 4 thus suggests
that increased uncertainty about funding conditions per se leads to a reduction
in bank protability. This is consistent with evidence for a sharp drop in banks
returns on equity in the second half of 2007 when funding uncertainty initially
increased (Bank of England Financial Stability Report, April 2008, p. 38). It is
also consistent, all else equal, with decreases in banks stock prices and market
capitalizations.
Indeed, recalling the banks prot function = (rL   r)L+(r   rD)D+(r )K,
it is clear that the bank may no longer by able to cover its cost of capital  (i.e.,
the return required by its shareholders) under conditions of heightened funding
uncertainty. This possibility becomes more likely if the cost of capital itself varies
positively with the degree of funding uncertainty or risk aversion in the market (that
is, (; 2M) non-decreasing in both arguments). The bank may also become loss-
making overall in the presence of xed costs that need to be covered for it to be
operational.
 Consumer welfare. In the benchmark model, a bank is e¤ectively a monopolist
in the market for loans and a monopsonist in that for deposits. In the absence of
funding uncertainty (or with risk-neutrality), therefore, equilibrium features too few
loans (for which the banks customers pay too much interest) and too few deposits
(on which depositors receive too little interest) and monopoly prots for the bank
in both markets (where rL > r > r

D).
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Recall from Proposition 2 that a risk-averse bank reacts asymmetrically to an
increase in funding uncertainty it either decreases loans and increases deposits or
vice versa. This has important implications for the relative levels of bank prots and
consumer welfare between these two markets. The idea is straightforward: Suppose
that the market for loans is very attractive (for example, because borrowers have a
high willingness-to-pay) relative to the market for deposits. If funding uncertainty
is low, the bank will wish to have a high loan-to-deposit ratio and to borrow heavily
in the interbank market. As funding uncertainty increases, the bank reduces its
loan-to-deposit ratio, with zero interbank exposure L = D + K in the limit as
2M ! 1. The point is that the level of deposits that satises this zero-exposure
constraint may well be much higher than that associated with low levels of funding
uncertainty and may even exceed that of a competitive market.
This possibility is most easily illustrated with a linear loan demand function
fL(L) = L   LL, and a linear deposit supply function fD(D) = D + DD.
Letting  L  (L   r) and  D  (r   D), where L > r > D, note that the
rst-best, competitive outcome in which both loans and deposits are priced at the
banks expected marginal cost of funding, involves LFB =  L=L (for which rL = r)
and DFB =  D=D (for which rD = r). By contrast, the two rst-order conditions
for a risk-averse bank can be written as 
L  ( L   2LL) 2M (L D  K) = 0
and 
D  ( D   2DD) +2M (L D  K) = 0. These can be solved, in the limit
as 2M !1, for
L =
1
2
( L +  D) + DK
(L + D)
and D =
1
2
( L +  D)  LK
(L + D)
: (23)
If the market for loans is very attractive (in that  L is high), then this increases
equilibrium loans, but also increases equilibrium deposits (recalling the loan-deposit
synergies result from Proposition 1).20 For su¢ ciently large  L, it is therefore pos-
sible that rD > r (if and only if D
 > DFB), so deposits become a loss leaderfor
the bank in that the deposit rate exceeds it own wholesale funding cost. Conversely,
equilibrium depositor welfare exceeds that of a competitive market. Of course, the
banks loan business is highly protable under these conditions, and the bank also
expects to make positive prots overall.21
Similar arguments can also be applied to show that loans may become a loss
leader for the bank (with positive prots from the deposits business), so rL < r, in
which case borrower welfare exceeds that of a competitive market. But since the
20The condition for equilibrium deposits to be non-negative is K  ( L +  D)=2L. (See also
note 8 above.)
21It easy to check that the banks expected prots (from both loans and deposits) are positive
even with zero capital E []K=0 =
1
4 (L D)2=(L+D), and that prots are higher with more
equity capital (as long as its cost of capital  is not too large).
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impact of funding uncertainty is asymmetric (Proposition 2), it is, of course, not
possible for both sides of the bank to be loss-making at the same time.22
Proposition 5 In the presence of funding uncertainty 2M > 0, it is possible for
either a banks loan or its deposit business to be loss-making (in expectation), that
is rL < r or r

D > r.
This result shows that risk-based synergies between the two sides of a banks
balance sheet (Proposition 1) can lead to cross-subsidization even where a banks
loan and deposit businesses are entirely independent in terms of demand and supply
conditions as well as operating costs.23
While it seems clear that competition for bank deposits has intensied since the
beginning of the nancial crisis, it can be di¢ cult to tell in practice at what point
deposits actually turn into a loss leader. Nonetheless, some recent developments
in the UK are striking: Banks are seeking to attract retail inows by increasing
deposit rates: retail bonds now pay around 200 basis points above the risk-free rate,
compared to a sub-zero spread in 2005(Bank of England Financial Stability Report,
December 2009, p. 38).
The broader point here is that heightened funding uncertainty and loan-deposit
synergies can have surprisingly strong implications for consumer welfare.
7 Interest rate pass-through
Central banks around the world responded to the recent turmoil in nancial mar-
kets by aggressively cutting interest rates in order to encourage bank lending and
stimulate demand more generally. However, many policymakers and commentators
expressed surprise at the apparently small impact that this loosening of monetary
policy had on interest rates, especially across credit markets. For example, the
minutes of the Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) noted that some mem-
bers were concerned that the e¤ectiveness of cuts in the target federal funds rate
may have been diminished by the nancial dislocations, suggesting that further pol-
icy action might have limited e¢ cacy in promoting a recovery in economic growth
(FOMC Minutes of the Meeting of 2829 October 2008). I now argue that height-
ened uncertainty about banks funding conditions can provide an explanation for
this apparent reduction in monetary policy e¤ectiveness.
22So either rL > r

D > r (deposits are loss-making, but loans are highly protable) or r > r

L >
rD (loans are loss-making, but deposit funds are very cheap), while there is always a positive
intermediation margin, (rL   rD) > 0, in equilibrium.
23Note that the bank would not wish to shut down (or sell) its loss-making business as this
would expose it to innite funding uncertainty from a stand-alone operation based only on the
other business.
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Within the context of the model, a central banks control of the short-term
interest rate can be thought of as a¤ecting the expected money market rate r. In
particular, recall the decomposition of the banks funding rate into the central banks
policy rate plus a bank-specic spread. Thus a change in the central banks rate
leads, all else equal, to an identical change in a commercial banks expected funding
rate. The impact of a monetary policy adjustment is then captured by the rates of
interest pass-through on loans and deposits,
L  (drL=dr) and D  (drD=dr) .
So if the expected interest rate in money markets changes by 100 basis points, then
loan and deposit rates change (approximately) by 100L and 100D basis points
respectively.
Equilibrium interest rate pass-through on loans can also be written as
L = f
0
L(L
)
dL
dr
, (24)
where, using the same method as in previous sections, there is a direct and an
indirect e¤ect as follows:
dL
dr
=
@L
@r
+
@L
@D
@D
@r
1  @L

@D
@D
@L
 : (25)
Now, using the expressions for @L=@D and @D=@L from (11) and (12), noting that
@L=@r =  1=( LL + 2M) and @D=@r = 1=( DD + 2M), and some further
rearranging yields
L =
 f 0L(L)
 LL + 2M

1 +
LL
DD
 . (26)
The same approach on the deposits side gives
D =
f 0D(D
)
 DD + 2M

1 +
DD
LL
 . (27)
The equilibrium rates of interest pass-through are both positive, so a bank op-
timally increases interest rates on both loans and deposits in response to a higher
expected money market rate (and vice versa). However, by inspection of (26) and
(27), it is also clear that funding uncertainty (that is, higher 2M) exerts a strong
downward pressure on pass-through in both markets.
Characterizing the necessary condition for interest rate pass-through to be lower
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with funding uncertainty turns out be messy since, in general, changes in LL and
DD need to be taken into account (thus involving third-order e¤ects). Given that
these are hard to interpret, I instead present a set of simple su¢ cient conditions
for pass-through to be dampened by uncertainty in the money markets. Let L 
 Lf 00L(L)=f 0L(L) and D  Df 00D(D)=f 0D(D) denote measures of curvature for loan
demand and deposit supply respectively. Noting that LL =  f 0L(L) [2  L(L)] >
0 and  DD = f 0D(D) [2  D(D)] > 0 yields the following result.
Proposition 6 (i) If loan demand curvature L and deposit supply curvature D
are both constant, then interest rate pass-through on loans L and deposits 

D is
lower in the presence of funding uncertainty 2M > 0 than when 
2
M = 0;
(ii) If loan demand and deposit supply are both linear (so L = 0 and D = 0),
then interest rate pass-through on loans L and deposits 

D is decreasing in funding
uncertainty 2M ;
(iii) Interest rate pass-through on loans and deposits is zero (so L = 

D = 0) in the
limit as funding uncertainty 2M !1.
Part (i) of the result covers a fairly wide range of well-known demand and supply
specications. For example, loan demands that are quadratic (L =  1), linear
(L = 0), exponential (L ! 1) or have constant elasticity (L = 1 + 1=L, where
L > 0 is the price elasticity of demand for loans) all satisfy the constant-curvature
property. Part (ii) is easily veried by inspection of (26) and (27) since  LL and
 DD are both constants with linear demand and supply.
Finally, to understand part (iii) of the result, recall that in the limit as 2M !
1, money market exposure M = 0 and so the balance sheet constraint becomes
L = D + K. In response to higher funding costs, a bank would want to increase
interest rates on both loans and deposits, but this would mean fewer loans and more
deposits thus violating the balance sheet constraint. Hence, both rates of interest
pass-through are zero in the limit.24
Although not completely general, Proposition 6 suggests that interest rate pass-
through will typically be dampened when uncertainty on banks funding conditions
is high.25 Put di¤erently, bankspricing of loans and deposits becomes more rigid
and less responsive to shocks.In this sense, monetary policy becomes less e¤ective
24See also the example with linear demand and supply from Section 6, noting that L and D
in (23) are both independent of the expected interbank rate r (since  L +  D = L   D).
25In the risk-neutral case, both pass-through rates are independent of funding uncertainty (and
also independent of one another). Note also that, in general, the level of interest rate pass-through
is itself quite sensitive to the value of curvature parameter. For example, with risk-neutrality, pass-
though on loans L = 1= [2  L(L)] is less than 50% if demand is linear or concave (for which
L  0), but exceeds 100% with constant-elasticity demand (for which L > 1). Finally, notice
that interest pass-through in the risk-neutral case is constant only if the curvature parameter is
constant, L(L) = L.
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at inuencing a banks decision-making process with market interest rates on loans
and deposits completely frozen in the limiting case. Again, the same conclusions
also hold in that increased risk aversion is typically associated with lower degrees of
interest rate pass-through and less e¤ective monetary policy.
Proposition 6 may thus help provide an explanation for the reduced impact that
interest rate cuts by central banks in the 2007/9 nancial crisis are commonly said
to have had.26 Clearly, it would be interesting and useful for any future econometric
research on pass-through to empirically test this prediction more formally.
Finally, observe that overall rate of pass-through to loan and deposit markets
would be even lower if the initial pass-through from the central banks policy rate
to an individual banks funding rate is itself also reduced by funding uncertainty.
8 Extensions
The benchmark model o¤ers a stylized way to capture the impact of funding uncer-
tainty on a banks balance sheet, equilibrium interest rates on loans and deposits,
and for the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy via interest rate pass-through.
I show in this section that the key insights obtained from the preceding analysis
are considerably more general. In particular, I relax the underlying assumptions
in turn by allowing the bank (i) to be exposed to multiple risks (as opposed to
a single risk in form of funding uncertainty); (ii) to face competition in loan and
deposit markets from other banks (as opposed to being a monopolist); and (iii) to
engage in price-setting behaviour by choosing interest rates on its loans and deposits
(as opposed to engaging in quantity-setting behaviour by committing to loan and
deposit volumes).
 Extension 1: Exposure to multiple risks. To focus sharply on the impact of
funding uncertainty, the benchmark model makes the simplifying assumption that
the bank faces a single risk. In practice, of course, a bank faces additional risks such
as credit risks in its loan portfolio or uncertainty on the deposits side. Modeling
these can make the analysis much more complicated. For example, if the additional
risks on loans and deposits are themselves correlated, a banks decisions may be-
come interdependent even in the absence of funding uncertainty thus skewing the
theoretical benchmark that implicitly underlies Proposition 1 especially.27 Nonethe-
less, under fairly mild conditions, the key insights from the benchmark model are
26It also suggests that any empirical evidence for banks adjusting interest rates by less than
otherwise would have may in fact reect a rational response to heightened funding uncertainty
rather than being indicative of collusive behaviour, for example.
27Note also that with multiple risks, increases in funding uncertainty need no longer be equivalent
to increases in risk aversion (as they are in the benchmark model).
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preserved in settings with multiple risks.
Using the same arguments as in Section 3, the rst-order conditions for the
bank can be written as 
L  E [L]     cov (;L) = 0 and 
D  E [D]    
cov (;D) = 0. Suppose now that the marginal risks on loans and deposits are
given by
cov (;L) = 

2MM + L(L;D)

and cov (;D) =  

2MM   D(L;D)

(28)
where L(L;D) reects the marginal risk on loans due to other risk factors, and,
similarly, D(L;D) on the deposits side. I allow both of these marginal risks to
depend arbitrarily on loans and deposits, while continuing to assume that second-
order conditions and stability conditions are satised.
A natural example that is a special case of this formulation has the banks
prot function  = (1   )rLL   rDD   rM   K, where  2 [0; 1) captures the
uncertain proportion of loans that turn out to be non-performing (which is taken to
be independent of funding uncertainty).
As in the benchmark model, loan-deposit synergies (Proposition 1), @L=@D > 0
and @D=@L > 0, exist if and only if marginal prots are negatively correlated,
cov (L;D) < 0, which here is equivalent to 2M > LD()  @L(L;D)=@D. Un-
surprisingly, a su¢ cient (and, in a sense, necessary) condition for loan-deposit syn-
ergies is that such complementarities also exist amongst the other risk factors, that
is LD()  0. In general, however, loan-deposit synergies always obtain for large
enough funding uncertainty 2M .
It is also easy to check, using the same techniques as in the benchmark analysis,
that Proposition 2 and 3 continue to hold with multiple risks. In particular, higher
funding uncertainty induces a bank with a high loan-to-deposit ratio to increase
loans and decrease deposits (so both interest rates increase, at least in expectation),
while the same conclusion also goes through, in general, in response to reductions
in equity capital.
For Proposition 4, recall that expected prots change with funding uncertainty
according to dE [] =d2M = E[L] (dL
=d2M) + E[D] (dD
=d2M). Consider the
case where the bank is a net borrower in the money market,M  0. By Proposition
2, dL=d2M  0 and dD=d2M  0. Now observe, from the rst-order conditions,
that E[L] =   cov (;L) and E[D] =   cov (;D). Therefore, su¢ cient con-
ditions for expected prots to decrease, dE [] =d2M  0, are that cov (;L)  0
and cov (;D)  0, which again always obtain for large enough funding uncertainty
2M . Note also that these conditions are equivalent to dL
=d  0 and dD=d  0;
in other words, an increase in risk aversion induces a highly extended bank to cut
back its loan commitments and increase its deposit base.
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Examples for loss-leading behaviour on the loan or deposit sides (Proposition 5)
can also be constructed under multiple risks, even though there often is a tendency
for such additional risks to reduce a banks optimal deposit and loan volumes, thus
making loss leaders less likely. Finally, the analysis of interest rate pass-through
(Proposition 6) unfortunately becomes much more complicated with multiple risks,
although I expect that heightened funding uncertainty still dampens pass-through
in a similar sense to the benchmark model. Indeed, for large funding uncertainty
2M , it is clear that the bank will avoid money market exposure similar to above, so
its balance sheet constraint L  D + K and interest rate pass-through on loans
and deposits is again (approximately) zero.
 Extension 2: Competition between banks. The setup underlying the bench-
mark model is also easily extended to Nash-Cournot competition between n  2
risk-averse banks (which might also be o¤ering di¤erentiated savings and loan prod-
ucts).
Suppose that the inverse demand curve for loans from bank j is given by rjL =
gL

Lj + L
P
k 6=j L
k

, where g0L() < 0 similar to above, and L 2 [0; 1] is a measure
of (symmetric) product di¤erentiation between the loans associated with di¤erent
banks. Similarly, deposit supply for bank j is given by rjD = gD

Dj + D
P
k 6=j D
k

,
where g0D() > 0 and D 2 [0; 1]. This setup now e¤ectively nests all market
structures ranging from perfect competition (with L = D = 1 and n ! 1) to
monopoly (with L = 0 and D = 0 or n = 1). The banks prots are j =
rjLL
j   rjDDj   rjM j    jKj, where rj is the uncertain funding rate (possibly bank-
specic) on its money market exposure M j, and E[rj] = r and var(rj) = 2M as
above.
As above, bank j maximizes expected utility subject to its balance sheet con-
straint
max
Lj ;Dj
E

U
 
j

subject to M j = Lj  Dj  Kj, (29)
where, with a slight abuse of notation, let jL  @j=@Lj and jD  @j=@Dj. I
continue to assume that the second-order conditions for the underlying risk-neutral
case are satised, that is jLL  @jL=@Lj < 0 and jDD  @jD=@Dj < 0. Again,
using Taylor expansions (or Steins lemma) as in the benchmark model, the rst-
order conditions can be written as

jL  E

jL
    cov  j;jL = 0 (30)
and

jD  E

jD
    cov  j;jD = 0. (31)
Moreover, it is easy to check that cov
 
j;jL

= 2MM
j while cov
 
j;jD

=
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 2MM j, exactly analogous to the single-bank setting.
Although a banks prots component, of course, varies with di¤erent forms of
competition, the funding uncertainty component of the problem is essentially un-
changed. In particular, each banks marginal risks move in opposite directions,
cov
 
jL;
j
D

=  2M < 0, again regardless of whether the bank is a borrower or
lender in the interbank market. Thus, loan-deposit synergies exist at the level of an
individual bank, @Lj=@Dj 2 (0; 1) and @Dj=@Lj 2 (0; 1), just as in Proposition 1.
Summing the rst-order conditions yields that, in symmetric Nash-Cournot equi-
librium, in which each bank has the same amount of equity capital Kj = K=n (and
letting Lj = L=n, Dj = D=n, and M j = M=n),
e
L  E[eL]  2MM = 0 and e
D  E[eD] + 2MM = 0, (32)
where eL Pnj=1 jL for loans and eD Pnj=1 jD for deposits respectively. These
two conditions correspond to (6) and (7) above, and together implicitly dene equi-
librium total loans L and deposits D by all n  2 banks. I assume that the
industry-level marginal prots on loans and deposits, eL and eD, are both also
downward-sloping, that is, eLL  @eL=@L < 0 and eDD  @eD=@D < 0. This
ensures that the industry-level equilibrium conditions from (32) are well-behaved in
that aggregatesecond-order and stability conditions are satised.
Under these mild conditions, the loan-deposit synergies at the level of an indi-
vidual bank carry over to the industry-level, that is @L=@D 2 (0; 1) and @D=@L 2
(0; 1). The reason is that industry-level marginal risks are also negatively corre-
lated, cov(eL; eD) =  n22M < 0. Again, since both cross-e¤ects lie within the unit
circle, the overall equilibrium is unique and stable. Moreover, in symmetric equilib-
rium, each bank chooses the same loan and deposit volumes, so they are either all
borrowers or all lenders in the money market, and respond to changes in funding
uncertainty in the same way.
The insights from the benchmark model thus carry over to such richer settings
with competition between banks. To see why, observe that the arguments that led
to Propositions 2 to 5 do not depend on the details of the prot function, but only
rely on basic second-order conditions and stability conditions being satised. So the
same techniques used for the benchmark model can be applied to the industry-level
equilibrium conditions e
L = 0 and e
D = 0 to show that the above results continue
to hold with competition between banks.
Finally, the degree of interest rate pass-through is, of course, a¤ected by changes
in market structure. However, the general tendency for funding uncertainty to
dampen pass-through is preserved in that Proposition 6 applies, in exactly the same
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way, to this setting.28 For example, with homogeneous products and linear demand
and supply schedules (rL = L  LL and rD = D + DD), it is easy to check that
equilibrium interest rate pass-through
L = 

D =
n
(n+ 1) + 2M

1
L
+
1
D
 . (33)
Clearly, pass-through rates on loans and deposits are decreasing in funding uncer-
tainty, and both tend to zero as funding uncertainty becomes large (thus conrming
parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 6). Note also that interest rate pass-through in-
creases with competition (that is, in the number of banks) in this example, consistent
with recent evidence for the Eurozone (see, e.g., van Leuvensteijn, Kok Sørenson,
Bikker and van Rixtel, 2008).
 Extension 3: Price-setting behaviour. The benchmark model assumes that
the bank commits to quantities by choosing deposit and loan volumes to maximize
expected utility. This makes interpreting the results particularly straightforward
given that the banks balance sheet constraint is also in terms of quantities. Al-
ternatively, however, one can think of a bank as choosing prices that is, interest
rates on deposits and loans. I show that the results for the benchmark model are
exactly the same with price-setting behaviour, and the insights also extend to a
model of Nash-Bertrand competition between banks.
Consider a single bank that faces a demand for loans L = f 1L (rL), supply of
deposits D = f 1D (rD), and maximizes expected utility by choosing interest rates:
max
rL;rD
E [U ()] subject to M = L D  K, (34)
where I continue to assume that the second-order conditions for the underlying risk-
neutral case are satised. Using the same arguments as in the benchmark case, the
two rst-order conditions can be written as 
L  E

L
    cov  ;L = 0 and

D  E

D
     cov  ;D = 0 (where L  @=@rL and D  @=@rD).
On the loans side, it is easy to check that E

L

= L + (rL   r) =f 0L(L) and
28For part (i) of Proposition 6, dene ZL  (L=n) [1 + L(n  1)], so the curvature of loan
demand L(ZL)   ZLg00L(ZL)=g0L(ZL) in symmetric equilibrium (where Lj = L=n). Demand
curvature is constant if L(ZL) = L and linear if L = 0. Similarly, on the deposit side, dene
ZD  (D=n) [1 + D(n  1)] so supply curvature D(ZD)  ZDg00D(ZD)=g0D(ZD) in symmetric
equilibrium. (Note also that industry-level marginal prots on loans are downward-sloping eLL < 0
if and only if L(ZL) < [2 + L(n  1)], and, for deposits, eDD < 0 if and only if D(ZD) >
  [2 + D(n  1)]. Similar to the benchmark model, loan demand is not too convex and deposit
supply is not too concave.)
26
cov
 
;L

= 2MM=f
0
L(L). It follows that the equilibrium condition for loans

L  [L+ (rL   r) =f 0L(L)]  2MM=f 0L(L) = 0. (35)
Observe that this is equivalent to the benchmark model since 
L = 
L=f 0L(L), and
so 
L = 0 if and only if 
L = 0. In other words, for any level of funding uncertainty,
the bank chooses exactly the same loan rate and loan volume as in the benchmark
model. The same analysis and conclusion also hold on the deposits side (
D = 0 if
and only if 
D = 0), which already implies that the results from Propositions 1 to
6 apply in exactly the same way under price-setting behaviour.
These results can also be extended to settings with competition between price-
setting banks. For example, consider a di¤erentiated products Nash-Bertrand model
in which bank js loan demand Lj = hL
 
rjL   cLr jL

and deposit supply Dj =
hD
 
rjD   cDr jD

(where h0L () < 0 while h0D () > 0, r jL 
P
k 6=j r
k
L and r
 j
D P
k 6=j r
k
D reect the interest rates set by other banks, and r
j
L   cLr jL > 0 and
rjD cDr jD > 0). For simplicity, I here assume that loan demand and deposit supply
are both linear, so h00L () = h00D () = 0.
Each bank solves maxrjL;rjD E [U (
j)] subject to its balance sheet constraint
M j = Lj   Dj   Kj. Using the same arguments as in the benchmark case, bank
js rst-order conditions can be written as 

j
L  E[
j
L]     cov(j;
j
L) = 0 and


j
D  E[
j
D] cov(j;
j
D) = 0 (where 
j
L  @j=@rjL and 
j
D  @j=@rjD). With
a linear demand-supply structure, second-order conditions for the underlying risk-
neutral benchmark (with  = 0) are always satised, and it is also easy to check that
the marginal risks cov(j;
j
L) = 
2
MM
jh0L () and cov(j;
j
D) =  2MM jh0D (), re-
spectively.
Summing the rst-order conditions yields that, in symmetric Nash-Bertrand
equilibrium, in which each bank sets the same interest rates on loans and deposits,
rjL = rL and r
j
D = rD (so also L
j = L=n, Dj = D=n, Kj = K=n, and M j = M=n),
e
L  [L+ n(rL   r)h0L ()]  2MMh0L () = 0 (36)
and e
D  [ D + n(r   rD)h0D ()] + 2MMh0D () = 0. (37)
These two industry-level conditions again correspond to (6) and (7) from the
benchmark model, and together implicitly dene equilibrium total loans L and
deposits D by all n  2 price-setting banks. With the linear-demand supply struc-
ture, loan-deposit synergies exist at both the level of an individual bank, and at the
industry-level. Once again, the same techniques used for the benchmark model can
be applied to the industry-level equilibrium conditions e
L = 0 and e
D = 0 to show
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that Propositions 2 to 5 continue to hold with competition. Moreover, interest rate
pass-through is dampened under funding uncertainty in the sense corresponding to
parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 6.
9 Concluding comments
Uncertainty over funding conditions in the money market makes a fundamental
di¤erence to an otherwise standard model of banking due to the risk-based synergies
between loans and deposits that it creates. Although there is a sizeable literature on
models of banking competition, existing contributions do not incorporate the role
of funding uncertainty in money markets and the resulting loan-deposit synergies
identied here. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, this paper is the rst to
examine interest rate pass-through in a setting with risk-averse banks, and to identify
the possibility of deposits turning into a loss leaderdue to funding uncertainty.
The main results are that, in banking systems with high loan-to-deposit ratios,
increased funding uncertainty tends to make banks and their shareholders worse
o¤, and also reduces the welfare of borrowers due to higher loan rates and reduced
lending volumes. By contrast, savers may end up benetting substantially from
more intense competition for retail deposits. The analysis can also help explain why
banks with a strong deposit base appear to have done better throughout the recent
nancial crisis, and why other banks such as Royal Bank of Scotland are now aiming
to reduce their loan-to-deposit ratios back towards 100%. Finally, monetary policy
becomes less e¤ective in the sense that banks rationally pass on to borrowers and
depositors a smaller proportion of changes in the central banks policy rate than in
a world without funding uncertainty.
An advantage of the model presented here is that it delivers a surprisingly rich
set of implications using a simple framework that is driven solely by a volatility
shock in form of increased uncertainty over banks funding conditions. The ba-
sic mechanism banks substituting away from money market funding to less risky
sources of nance seems fairly robust to changes in model specication such as
competition between banks and multiple sources of uncertainty (as shown in the
extensions). However, thinking about bank behaviour and its implications for the
economy is a complex task (especially in the context of a nancial crisis), and the
model admittedly abstracts from many important issues.
For example, the present analysis has been based on the premise that commer-
cial banks are risk-averse or at least that they turn risk-averse in the context of
a nancial crises. As noted above, this assumption can be backed up with various
theoretical arguments and has some empirical support, but it is, of course, also
somewhat restrictive. An alternative approach would be to generate a concern for
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risk management along the lines of Froot and Stein (1998). They assume that a
banks cost of obtaining non-deposit external nance is an increasing and (strictly)
convex function of the amount of funds raised. A direct way of mapping this ap-
proach into the present analysis is to assume the bank is risk-neutral but that its
cost of interbank market borrowing is given by C(M) = rM + (w=2)M2, where
M  0 and w > 0 is a measure of the severity of the external nance premium. The
banks problem then is to maxL;D E[] = rLL  rDD  K  C(M), subject to the
balance sheet constraintM = L D K. It is not di¢ cult to see that the rst-order
conditions for this problem are identical to (6) and (7) in the benchmark model (by
setting w  2M). It follows immediately that Propositions 13, 5 and 6 apply in
exactly the same way after replacing funding uncertaintywith external nance
premium.An increase in the latter can similarly be interpreted as a representation
of tighter funding conditions.29
Relatedly, the benchmark model identies increased funding uncertainty with
higher volatility of the funding rates obtained on unsecured term loans in the inter-
bank market. This approach is consistent with Taylor and Williams(2009) evidence
of increased interest-rate volatility in measures such as three-month LIBOR rates.
Another approach would be to consider funding uncertainty over quantities rather
than prices. Such quantity-based uncertainties may arise, for example, due to credit
rationing in interbank markets, and may be particularly important when consider-
ing very short-term nancing. Recent empirical evidence from Afonso, Kovner and
Schoar (2011) suggests that both price- and quantity-based uncertainty played im-
portant roles in the U.S. overnight interbank market during 2008/9. Their analysis
particularly emphasizes credit rationing and the problem of rolling over interbank
debt on a day-to-day basis. It would be interesting and potentially instructive for
future research to combine both types of uncertainty into a single model.
Finally, the present paper has abstracted from general-equilibrium considera-
tions across funding markets, as well as from integrating elements of asymmetric
information between banks into the modelling approach. Future work might com-
bine the detailed equilibrium analysis of bank behaviour in loan and deposit markets
presented here with a more general setup that explicitly takes into account the mi-
crostructure of interbank markets. More research into why funding conditions in
money markets became so volatile in the rst place is clearly also still needed.
29Of course, this is not the whole story in Froot and Stein (1998), since their multi-period
approach involves a wealth shock that leads to ex post adjustments to the quantity of external
borrowing, M . Because of the convexity assumption, these ex post uctuations increase a banks
expected funding costs and thus generate more risk-averse behaviour from an ex ante point of view.
I expect that jointly modelling (i) an increase in the severity of the external nance premium (that
is, higher w), as well as (ii) an increase in the ex post volatility of the funding requirement (that
is, higher var(M)) would exacerbate the results from the present analysis without a¤ecting their
qualitative nature.
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